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HEIDEGGER’S (DIS)ENGAGEMENT WITH
ASIAN LANGUAGES
Language is a prominent issue in Martin Heidegger’s concern with
Asian thought.1 On a number of occasions, he suggests that language
is the most central topos for the question of East–West dialogue. In
“On the Question of Being,” he speaks of “the realm of possible
dialogue between (the language of Europe and that of East Asia),”
although “neither is able on its own to open or to found this realm.”2
In “A Dialogue on Language—between a Japanese and an Inquirer,”
he expresses his concern whether what he had been attempting to
think of as the nature of language was “also” adequate for the nature
of the East Asian languages and whether there could be a nature of
language that could ground the opening up of an East–West dia-
logue.3 Below is a remark virtually unknown,
One theme appears to me to be inevitable: Speech and Writing; here
become evident the essential questions of East–West dialogue; ques-
tions of signification and image in the widest sense can be brought
into the open.4
This remark appeared in a letter dated April 6, 1955. It was addressed
to Emil Pretorius, President of the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts,
who had invited Heidegger to give a lecture in a series entitled “Of
Language.”
It seems that Heidegger has seriously thought about relevant issues
connected with Asian languages. However, disparate strands of con-
siderations are entangled together in his claims. On the one hand, he
suggests that there is a radical inaccessibility of these languages. This
seems to be an incontrovertible reason for him to disengage himself
from Asian thought. On the other hand, he makes inquires about
words from these languages that might correspond to some of his key
notions important for his project of reenacting the other beginning of
Western philosophy. These signs and gestures point to reverse direc-
tions and entail apparently irreconcilable implications.
The purpose of this article is to provide a balanced and convincing
account of Heidegger’s dis(engagement) with Asian languages. It
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begins by examining Heidegger’s fleeting remarks bearing upon East
Asian languages, several of which are scattered in a number of texts
published in German and have rarely been brought into discussion.
Then I investigate two prominent cases where Heidegger attends to
words from Asian languages: One is his inquiry about Sanskrit words
in 1960, the other is the discussion about the Japanese words for art at
the colloquium “Art and Thinking” held on May 18, 1958 in Freiburg.
These two episodes, especially Heidegger’s direct contact with Indian
thought, have gone almost unnoticed.
I. An Ontological Barrier
In a letter dated June 30, 1955 to Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist,
Heidegger observes,
Today I am amazed that years ago I dared to give the lecture on
language. The greatest omission belongs to the fact that the possibil-
ity for a sufficient [zureichenden] discussion about the East Asian
languages is lacking [fehlt].5
Heidegger seems to regret that, when he delivered the lecture on
language, it was not possible to discuss East Asian languages.6 He calls
this the “greatest omission.” What is bewildering is that, if Heidegger
considers that a “sufficient” discussion of East Asian languages is of
primal importance, why he did not commit himself to obtaining as
much knowledge as possible about these languages. This seems to be
a rather naïve question. A ready answer is that these languages are
so formidably difficult that most Western philosophers cannot gain
access to them.This is what Heidegger sometimes mentions. In a letter
of June 20, 1966 to Matsuo Keikichi, a Japanese translator of Being
and Time,7 he remarks,
Because we Europeans usually fail to have a command of the Japa-
nese language, unfortunately the necessary mutual understanding
comes from one side only.8
Here Heidegger appears to be commenting on the empirical fact
that most Europeans do not have a command of the Japanese lan-
guage, and thus understanding between Europeans and Japanese is
inevitably unilateral. He may well have in view the fact that numerous
Japanese scholars consider their own tradition from the perspective of
Western conceptual systems.9 Therefore, their own understanding of
Japanese tradition could also be said to be unilateral.
In his letter to the organizers of the symposium “Heidegger and
Eastern Thought” held in Honolulu on November 17–21, 1969,
Heidegger again shows regret at the lack of the command of Eastern
languages,
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Again and again it has seemed urgent to me that a dialogue take
place with the thinkers of what is to us the Eastern world. The
greatest difficulty in this enterprise always lies, as far as I can see, in
the fact that with few exceptions there is no command of the Eastern
languages either in Europe or in the United States. . . . May your
conference prove fruitful in spite of this precarious [mißlichen]
circumstance.10
Heidegger attributes the “greatest difficulty” of an East–West dia-
logue to the lack of command of Eastern languages in the West.
However, Heidegger’s statement is somewhat out of place, because
most participants of this conference were at home with both Asian
and European languages. Heidegger should have been aware of this
fact. Therefore, his stress upon the inaccessibility of East Asian lan-
guages must be more than an empirical observation.
Before elaborating this point, I would like to supplement the back-
ground of Heidegger’s letter.A large part of this letter was read out in
the introduction address by Winfield E. Nagley, one of the organizers,
and published in the first piece of the special issue of Philosophy East
and West, entitled “Introduction to the Symposium and Reading of a
Letter from Martin Heidegger.”11 However, the full text of Heideg-
ger’s letter, dated July 4, 1969, became available only in the year 2000
when it was printed in volume 16 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe. In
fact, the last paragraph of his letter was omitted in what was published
in Philosophy East and West. Probably, Nagley did not read it out to
the conference participants either. In the last paragraph of his letter,
Heidegger states,
Now in regard to the words of welcome and introduction for which
you ask, I have to appeal to your kindness to excuse me for not
honouring your request. From all sides I am receiving requests of this
kind so that I have to refuse every one of them in order not to offend
somebody.12
Heidegger declined the invitation to write “the words of welcome
and introduction” for this conference. Probably because of this
refusal, Heidegger was contacted again. In another letter dated
October 29, 1969 to Borgmann, another organizer, Heidegger gave
him permission to read out his previous letter at the conference and to
print it as a message of “special greetings and thanks to the partici-
pants of the conference.”13 Nagley did not mention the second letter.
It remains unknown whether this letter had already reached Nagley
when he gave his speech on November 17.
Another striking remark on the inaccessibility of East Asian lan-
guages is made during Heidegger’s conversation with Hellmuth
Hecker on August 30, 1952. Hecker was professor of philosophy at the
University of Hamburg and an important German scholar of Zen
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Buddhism. He recounted this conversation from memory in “A Walk
with Heidegger,” which was printed as an appendix of Willfred
Hartig’s monograph The Teaching of Buddha and Heidegger: Contri-
bution to East-West Dialogue of theThinking in theTwentieth Century.
An exchange in their conversation runs as follows:
Hecker: An important question: Have you engaged yourself with
Eastern, that is, Indian and Chinese philosophy?
Heidegger: Hardly. The linguistic difficulties with the translations are
insurmountable. I know what the difficulties are already with Greek;
one has to start when young to penetrate in this language. To the
Chinese and Japanese world I simply have no access. Sein und Zeit
has been translated into Japanese, but about the “how” I cannot
judge. With our logistic-grammatical conceptual apparatus there are
many words [when translating] that we cannot grasp sharply. For
example when I read the translations from Chinese by Richard
Wilhelm, I see that he has approached the text completely in the
framework of Kantian philosophy.14
That one has to start early to learn a difficult foreign language is a
trivial empirical truism. However, this is not Heidegger’s last word. In
reiterating linguistic difficulty and the lack of access to East Asian
languages, he invokes a nontrivial reason for it. That is, the logistic
framework of Western languages.
Certainly, Heidegger has access to Richard Wilhelm’s translation of
the Daodejing and of the Zhuangzi.15 In Heidegger’s eyes, Wilhelm
has read Kantian ideas into Laozi’s verses.16 In the following passage,
quite probably Heidegger is thinking of Wilhelm when he speaks of
Laozi being made into a Kantian. In another place, Heidegger writes,
[T]he lógoς-character of Western thought demands from us that if
we should dare to touch these alien worlds, we must first ask our-
selves whether we are capable at all of hearing that which was
thought there. This question becomes even more urgent, because
European thinking is threatening to become planetary [planetarisch],
in that contemporary Indians, Chinese and Japanese can usually
bring to us what is experienced by them only through our European
way of thinking. Thus from there and from here everything is stirred
around in an enormous hodge-podge, in which one cannot distin-
guish any more whether the ancient Indians were English empiricists
and Laotse a Kantian.17
This excerpt comes from the lecture series “Principles of Thinking”
which Heidegger delivered in 1957, where he shows concern about the
“planetarization” of the world in relation to those “alien worlds.” It is
clear that the inaccessibility of Asian languages is not simply due
to the fact that few Europeans enjoy mastery of these languages,
but more fundamentally due to the logistic framework of Western
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thinking. The dualistic metaphysical system has prevented European
people from being able to hear what was thought in the old traditions
of India, China, and Japan.
It must be noted that, for Heidegger, the awareness of linguistic
restriction itself does not arise from outside of Western thinking. On
the contrary, to consider the question whether “we are capable at
all of hearing that which was thought there” is a demand made by
the lógoς character of Western thinking itself! Whenever European
scholars should dare to touch those alien worlds, they need first ask
themselves this question. Both the failure of the capacity to compre-
hend Asian thought and the demand for an awareness of this, come
from the same source, the Western tradition itself.
Furthermore, the practice of making a Kantian out of Laozi cannot
be attributed only to Wilhelm in particular and to Western Sinologists
in general; contemporary Asian intellectuals are not exempt from it.
Heidegger draws attention to the fact that European way of thinking
is becoming “planetary.”This implies that the mode of experience and
thinking of contemporary Asian scholars is under strong European
influences. Therefore, their representation of Asian traditions is not
pure and authentic. The dominance of European framework of think-
ing leads to incautious identification or assimilation of Asian and
European thought, such that Indian thinkers are described in analogy
with English empiricists, and Laozi is represented as a Kantian. All
this chaos is generated by the planetarization of European thinking.
In Time and Being, Heidegger articulates similar considerations. He
states,
Being as presencing in the sense of calculable material [ . . . ] claims
all the inhabitants of the earth in a uniform manner without the
inhabitants of the non-European continents explicitly knowing this
or even being able or wanting to know of the origin of this determi-
nation of Being.18
For Heidegger, Being as presencing is essentially interrelated with
the metaphysical mode of representation of European languages.
Those people in the non-European continents are not excluded from
the planetary expansion of this mode of determination of Being, even
if they are not aware of this, or have no intention to know anything
about its origin. Not only European people have no access to Asian
thought, but also that Asian people themselves, dominated by the
planetary European mode of thinking, have no access to their own
traditions.
Now we are in a better position to understand Heidegger’s
complaint in his conversation with Hecker, “Sein und Zeit has been
translated into Japanese, but about the ‘how’ I cannot judge.” As
Heidegger’s lifelong friend Petzet records, in a conversation in his last
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years with a German scholar, Heidegger expressed skepticism about
“what his Japanese friends made out of his philosophy,” and said that
he “has difficulty believing blindly that thoughts in a language so
foreign would mean the same.”19 These utterances seem to entail a
relativism regarding the reverse side, that is, while European people
have no access to Asian languages, Asian people (in this case, Japa-
nese scholars) may not be able to gain adequate understanding of
European thought because of linguistic barriers. However, with a view
to what has been discussed in the foregoing, underlying Heidegger’s
comment on the Japanese translation of his work is something more
complicated. He seems to suggest that, because of the domination of
European metaphysical dualistic framework of thinking over the
Japanese mind, Japanese scholars may not be able to receive and
convey the message from Being and Time.
Inasmuch as European ways of thinking as determined by the logos
character of their languages have become planetary, inasmuch as
neither European nor Asian people have access to ancient Asian
traditions, Heidegger describes the circumstances as “precarious” in
his letter to the organizer of the Hawaii conference. The only way out
of the dilemma where access to Asian traditions is lacking lies in an
engagement with the inceptual thinking of Greek thinkers and their
language in the first place. As Heidegger states in his lecture “Science
and Reflection” delivered in August 1954, “a dialogue with the Greek
thinkers and their language [ . . . ] remains for us the precondition of
the inevitable dialogue with the East Asian world.”20
The precondition for engaging with Asian languages is a dialogue
with Greek thinkers. This is because the origin of Western metaphysi-
cal tradition resides in the first beginning initiated by Greek thinking
and its language; at the same time, a possibility for reversal is also
opened up. As Heidegger stresses on various occasions, only through
the renewal of Western tradition itself can there be a possibility for a
new beginning of thinking.21 In “The Principle of Identity,” Heidegger
writes,
Our Western languages are in different ways languages of metaphysi-
cal thinking. It must remain an open question whether the nature of
Western languages is in itself marked with the exclusive brand of
metaphysics, and thus marked permanently by onto-theo-logic, or
whether these languages offer other possibilities of saying—and that
means at the same time a telling unsaying [sagenden Nichsagens].22
Despite occasional criticism of Western languages, Heidegger has the
conviction that only through these languages could one find possibili-
ties for a true Saying. The other beginning of thinking is impossible
without what is already present in what is said in the first beginning.
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In opposing himself against what is today called Orientalist practice
of selecting intellectual sources from Eastern tradition according to
European interests and presenting them in conformity with European
conceptual systems, Heidegger seems to presuppose the existence of
pure ancient traditions uncontaminated by Western binary meta-
physical framework of representation. In a letter to Hellmuth Hecker
on February 16, 1955, Heidegger writes,
That Buddhism and not less so Chinese and Japanese thought need a
completely different interpretation, which is free from eighteenth
and nineteenth century images, needs no further elucidation given
my concerns about classic philosophy. However I miss the presuppo-
sitions for both.23
Now the question is, how to evaluate this anti-Orientalist practice?
What differentiates Heidegger from an anti-Orientalist is: For an
anti-Orientalist, viewing things from the East in a limited European
perspective manifests colonialist consciousness. Whether the Europe-
ans are world-historically doomed to resort to the Orientalist perspec-
tive remains unconsidered. In general, an anti-Orientalist thinks that
with proper hindsight, it is possible and necessary to transcend colo-
nialist consciousness and understand other cultures in their own right.
For Heidegger, it is not by accident, but world-historically out of
the evolvement of the history of Being, that the Orientalist attitude
toward Asian traditions, for this matter, arises. Furthermore, because
metaphysical thinking has become planetary, not only European
people but also contemporary Asian people are subject to what is
normally called Orientalist approach to their own tradition.
Sometimes Heidegger hints that the empirical/ontological time will
come when finally Eastern thought can be revealed in its authenticity
to Western people. For example, in the same conversation with
Hecker on August 30, 1952, there is the following exchange:
Hecker: Surely, one can find important matters in oriental
philosophy.
Heidegger: Certainly, but we have to develop the questions from (out
of) our Western thinking. First our philosophy up to now has to
become question-able. For the process of the encounter between
West and East I estimate 300 years [would be needed].24
In insisting that a transformation has to be enacted from within
Western thinking, Heidegger seems to have offered a crude
un-Heideggerian estimation about the time span when the East
becomes available and hence there could be a genuine East–West
encounter. However, according to the structure of his account of
temporality, what is to come is always yet to come; as a thinker always
remains on the way. Since it is indeterminate when the transformation
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of the Western tradition will be accomplished, it is also indeterminate
when the time will come when European people can ultimately have
access to non-Western sources. In this light, the presumption concern-
ing the existence of these sources that are uncontaminated by the
logos character of Western thinking remains extremely vague and
vacuous. In spite of all these problematics involved in Heidegger’s
general reflection on Asian languages, on various occasions he does
encounter concrete texts and words from Asian traditions. This is
examined in the subsequent sections.
II. Encounter with the Sanskrit Language
Despite the amount of comparative studies of Heidegger’s philoso-
phy in relation to Indian tradition, there are very few references to
Indian thought or language in his published works. In 1952, Heidegger
mentioned Indian philosophy once, but only to point out that,
together with Chinese philosophy, it is not philosophy.25 In a lecture of
1957, he pointed to the situation where “the ancient Indians” were
presented as English empiricists.26 In his commentary on Hölderlin’s
poems, he uses such phrases as “depths of Asia,” “the Indies,” “the
rivers of the Indians and the Greeks.”27 According to Jarava Lal
Mehta, a prominent phenomenologist of Indian origin, a partial expla-
nation for the scarcity of Heidegger’s references to Indian thought is
his critical attitude toward neo-Kantian presuppositions with which
most of his older contemporaries approached Eastern thought; in
addition, Sanskrit is an Indo-European language and so also involves
a subject–object structure that induces metaphysical thinking.28
Because of his contact with Medard Boss, a Swiss psychiatrist,
Heidegger develops a serious interest in Indian philosophy and the
Sanskrit language. Boss used Heidegger’s philosophy to construct his
own theory of medicine and psychiatry, which he called Daseinsana-
lytik as distinguished from psychoanalysis. He also took a strong
interest in Indian thought. During his two trips to India, he underwent
apprenticeship with a guru in Kashmir associated with the line of
Kashmiri Shaivism. His theory about dream is obviously influenced
by Indian ideas.29
Boss’ friendship with Heidegger started through correspondence in
1947, while Heidegger was still in difficult situation. By the time of his
death, Heidegger had sent Boss 256 letters and fifty greeting cards.
From 1959 to the end of the 1960s, at Boss’s invitation, Heidegger
gave regular seminars to fifty to seventy psychiatrists or psychiatry
students on a regular basis. Boss recorded these seminars as well as his
conversations with Heidegger in Zollikoner Seminare, Protokolle—
Gespräche—Briefe Herausgegeben von Medard Boss. In this collec-
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tion, Boss also includes edited versions of Heidegger’s handwritten
drafts for the seminars and letters addressed to him.30
In a letter on November 9, 1959, Heidegger admits, “the talk about
India [with Boss] showed me that my attempts do not remain totally
isolated.”31 Quite probably, Boss had drew Heidegger’s attention to
affinities between his thinking and Indian philosophy. In another
letter to Boss on March 7, 1960, Heidegger asked him to find out and
share with him Sanskrit words for “ontological difference,” that is, as
he explained, for “being” (Sein) and “beings” (Seiendes), and for
“unconcealedness” (Unverborgenheit) and “forgetfulness” (Verges-
senheit).32 On March 12, Boss contacted his colleague and former
student Erna M. Hoch, who was working in India. In this letter,
Boss mentioned that a few weeks before he wrote to Professor Kanti
Chandra Pandey of Lucknow University, a Sanskrit scholar and a
philosopher, to inquire about the Sanskrit equivalents of these terms;
but he failed to receive a reply. In this circumstance, he asked Hoch,
who had visited Pandey previously, to make a face-to-face inquiry.
According to the closeness of the dates of Heidegger and Boss’s
letters, it seems that Heidegger had already asked about the Sanskrit
words before March 7, 1960. The letter on March 7, 1960 may well be
a reminder of his special assignment.
Erna M. Hoch worked as a psychiatrist, psychotherapist, and doctor
in various capacities and locations in India from 1956 to 1988. She
seeks to integrate Western conceptions of psychiatry under the
influence of Heidegger’s Dasein-analysis with sources from Indian
tradition. The Indian philosopher Pandey was a representative of the
Kashmiri Shaivism. His major work includes a monumental book on
Abhı¯navagupta (tenth–eleventh century), the main exponent of this
school of Shaivism, commentaries on Abhı¯navagupta’s main treatises,
and a book on Western aesthetics.33
The first time when Hoch discussed her special mission was on the
occasion of Boss’s eightieth birthday in October, 1983. She wrote an
article in German on the basis of her notes in English typescript of
1960. This article was published in the journal Daseinsanalyse in
1985.34 The English version of Hoch’s report entitled “Messenger
between East and West” is included in her book entitled Sources and
Resources.AWestern Psychiatrist’s Search for Meaning in the Ancient
Indian Scriptures.35 In his letter to Hoch, Boss wrote:
These days, when Heidegger comes to stay with me, he shows more
and more interest in Indian thought. He regrets in particular that he
has no knowledge of Sanskrit. He now has asked me to inquire what
would be the Sanskrit of some fundamental terms and concepts.
Above all, he wishes to know whether the Sanskrit language can
distinguish between Being and beings.36
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Boss made a few preliminary suggestions about these words and
reminded Hoch, for his own sake and for that of Heidegger, to pay
attention to exploring the meaning of those words right down to the
connotations of the Sanskrit word-roots.37 Hoch visited Pandey on
March 20, 1960 and reported back to Boss. On receiving Boss’ reply
on April 10, with a lengthy list of detailed questions regarding her
notes of conversation with Pandey, Hoch again visited Pandey on
May 15.
According to Hoch’s record, there are two different roots for being
in the sense of the mode of being of individual beings: One is √as from
which forms in the present tense can be derived, such as sat, satta¯.
It expresses the fact of being as such.Another is √bhu¯ from which can
be derived verbal forms pertaining to the past and future, such as
bha¯vana. It indicates change, transformation, and development. The
suffix ta¯, meaning “capacity, power, possibility,” is normally added to
nouns and adjectives to form abstract nouns; satta¯, being a noun,
means the “possibility or power to be, being capable of being every-
thing.” The Sanskrit words for the highest Being is Maha¯satta¯ (maha¯
means “great, big”), which literally means “the absolute possibility of
being.” It is infinite, unlimited, and unchanging. On the basis of these
inquiries, Hoch concluded that Sanskrit gives expression to what
Heidegger calls the ontological difference.38 The words for “con-
cealedness” and “unconcealedness” are a¯v

rtatva and ana¯v

rtatva
respectively. The root of these words is √v

r, or √va

r, the original
condition. Hoch commented that Indian philosophy knows these
notions as well; however, it is difficult to establish relations of congru-
ence with Heidegger’s thought.39
Because of limitation of space, I cannot engage in a detailed presen-
tation and examination of Hoch’s report. Mehta once offers an illumi-
nating discussion of three Sanskrit words for being: the verb asti
(derived from the root√as), the abstract noun satta¯,andbha¯va (derived
from the root √bhu¯). He also mentions sat as the more commonly seen
word for being. 40 Mehta’s account is very similar to Hoch’s report.
In a letter on May 22, 1960, Boss told Hoch that Heidegger was
“extremely impressed” by the Indian view of Being and truth; yet,
there is nothing more bearing on the philosopher’s response than
that remark.41 Instead, Boss turned to his own view. According to
him, these inquiries reveal “the decisive difference” between ancient
Indian thought and Heidegger’s philosophy. This difference resides in
the “fundamentally different thinking about the role of ‘human being’
within the total ‘event’ of ‘Being.’ ”42 We will see this point again in a
short while.
In view of the richness of Hoch’s report, which was most probably
transferred to Heidegger, it is somewhat surprising that neither in his
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writing nor in his speech Heidegger has never commented on the
Sanskrit words he learned in this connection. In the seminar on Hera-
clitus held together with Eugen Fink in 1966–1967, when discussing
the nature of sleep in connection with Fragment 26 of Heraclitus,
Heidegger commented, “For Indians the state of sleep is the supreme
life.”43 This remark must have come from his acquaintance with
Indian thought through Boss and Hoch. Included in the latter’s report
are discussions of the state of deep sleep.44
On a few occasions in his discussion with Boss, Heidegger stresses
that there is a fundamental difference between his philosophy and
Eastern thought. In one of their conversations in the period April
24–May 4, 1963, during their vacation together in Taormina, Sicily,
when Heidegger was talking about Being and Dasein, Boss spoke of
how Indians would think about these issues,“Indian thought does not
require a guardian for the clearing. There is clearing in and for
itself.”45 Boss rightly saw that with Indians the human being does not
assume such an important role as Heidegger ascribes, that is, as a
guardian of Being. Heidegger concurred,
In contrast, it is very important to me that the human being is a
human being. In Indian thought, the point is “a giving up of being
human” in the sense of Da-sein’s self-transformation into the pure
luminosity [of Being].46
Heidegger put his finger on the right point. The role of human
beings is indeed conceived very differently in Western and Eastern
traditions. After Heidegger’s lengthy explication of his thoughts, Boss
asked him in what ways his conception of the matter of Being was
more adequate than Indian thought, which, Boss repeated, does not
need a guardian of clearedness. Heidegger responded:
My conception is more adequate, insofar as I am proceeding from
Da-sein and from [its] understanding of being, and insofar as I limit
myself to what can be experienced immediately. Thus, I do not need
assert anything about clearedness itself. [ . . . ] Above all, the above
quoted Indian insight cannot be assimilated into my thinking.47
In spite of Heidegger’s interest in Sanskrit words corresponding
to his key notions such as Being and beings, and unconcealedness,
he knew very well the important difference between his philosophy
and Indian ideas and insisted that his conception is more adequate.
A staunch defender for Heidegger’s special bond with the Chinese
dao would possibly takes as trivial his statement that the relevant
Indian insight cannot be assimilated into his thinking. However, it is
notable that Chinese Daoist thinking is also opposed to granting
the human being the most supreme status and to setting up an
abysmal gap between the human being and other beings. Therefore,
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Heidegger’s disclaimer can very well be extended to Chinese Daoist
thinking.
In response to Heidegger’s claim, Boss cited the Indian insight that
not only the essence of the human being but also the essence of all
other beings belong immediately to the clearedness in itself. Heideg-
ger reiterated the fundamental difference between humans and other
beings with reference to the criterion of whether or not possessing
language. He explained that hellen (to clear) occurs originally as
hallen (to resound), as tone, and stressed that all other beings fall
short of this grounding tone. Following this, Heidegger concluded
their conversation by a rhetorical question: “How close this is to
Indian insights into ultimate truths is best shown by my assertion:
‘Language is the house of being’?”48
Heidegger’s stress on the centrality of language is in a way a cor-
ollary of his emphasis on the unique status of the human being. This
idea is lacking in the majority of Asian traditions.As Elmar Weinmayr
points out, in Japanese thinking, language is regarded as one practice
among others. He calls this view lococentrism. In contrast, logocen-
trism is essential to European languages, according to which language
is regarded as the “one site of truth,” and is separated from other
practices.49
III. Is There a Japanese Word for Art?
Apart from “A Dialogue on Language,” another major event of
Heidegger’s involvement with Japanese language is a colloquium
on the theme “Art and Thinking” that he co-held with Hisamatsu
Shinichi in Freiburg on May 18, 1958. Hisamatsu (1889–1980) is a
well-known Zen Buddhist and university professor. In 1957 and 1958,
He traveled around the world, delivering lectures in the United States
(including one together with Suzuki Daisetz Teitaro at Harvard Uni-
versity). During his stay in Europe, he met Paul Tillich, Martin Buber,
Gabriel Marcel, Paul Bultmann, and Carl G. Jung. Hisamatsu met
Heidegger in Vienna where the latter presented his lecture “Poetry
and Thinking” on May 11, 1958.When they met again in Freiburg, they
held the colloquium on art and thinking.This meeting has rarely been
discussed. Through its investigation, we can obtain a clear picture of
Heidegger’s attitude toward Asian languages.
The participants of the colloquium included Hermann Gundert,
Max Müller, and Siegfried Bröse (these three from University of
Freiburg), Egon Vietta (from University of Darmstadt), Alfred L.
Copley, and another unidentified person referred to as Y. A record of
this colloquium with the focus on Heidegger’s contribution can be
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found in Japan und Heidegger.50 The more detailed proceedings were
edited by Copley and published in a slim trilingual version (English,
German, and Japanese) entitled Listening to Heidegger and Hisa-
matsu, with a few pieces of Copley’s Zen-style artwork.51
Heidegger opened the colloquium by remarking, “We would like
to, from our European standpoint, make an attempt to grasp certain
characteristics of the nature [Wesenszüge] of art.”52 After claiming
that whether art still occupies a place in this age is a pressing question,
he presented the opening question: “how that, which we call East
Asian art, is understood in itself?” As will be seen below, Heidegger’s
concern is with ancient (or at least pre-modern) Asian art that are not
affected by Western influences. Heidegger probed further,
In concrete terms we shall ask, keeping in mind the great variety
within the East Asian world, whether it is at all possible to speak of
art and art work in our sense [Sinn] of the word. Do you have a name
[Name] for art in Japan? 53
Heidegger seemed to be challenging the legitimacy of applying the
terms art and artwork, which are of Western origin, to East Asian art;
he urges for excavating characteristics of East Asian art as distinct
from Western transplantations. However, his focus swiftly moved to
the question whether there is a word in Japanese language that cor-
responds to the Western word “art.”
Contesting Heidegger’s line of thought, Gundert suggested a rever-
sal of Heidegger’s way of questioning. With this reversal, what are
taken to be art and artwork in the West are not the starting point.
Instead, one considers whether objects or phenomena treated as art in
the West would be acceptable from the perspective of East Asian
people. Gundert added that this is a matter of frequent disputation in
Japan. To this proposal that comes near to breaking through the
confines of Eurocentrism, Heidegger responded,
To answer that question one would have to question the notion of art
radically. We confine ourselves here to the preliminaries [ein vorläu-
figes]. Is there a Japanese word for what we call art?
Heidegger’s way of inquiring about Japanese words is strikingly
similar to that in “A Dialogue on Language.”
Inquirer: I shall permit myself for the moment to put to you an
altogether preliminary [durchaus vorläufige] question:What does the
Japanese world understand by language? Asked still more cau-
tiously: Do you have in your language a word for what we call
language? If not, how do you experience what with us is called
language?54
During his meeting with Tezuka Tomio (the prototypical figure for the
Japanese interlocutor in “A Dialogue”) in 1953, one of Heidegger’s
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questions is framed in exactly the same way: “Which words in Japa-
nese are the customary terms for appearance [Erscheinung] and
essence [Wesen]?”55
Despite Heidegger’s quasi-anti-Orientalist gestures as shown
toward the end of the first section of this article, he insists that one
should pursue questioning from within the “European standpoint,”
which he presented as the general framework of questioning for the
colloquium on art and thinking.56 Presumably, because of his concern
with the status of art in contemporary Europe, he would like to have
an idea how what is called art is understood in East Asia.
To Heidegger’s repeated question, Hisamatsu replies that the Japa-
nese word for art is geijiz (that is, geijutsu) ( ) ( ). This
is a compound word: Gei ( ) ( ) originally means capacity
(Können) and skillfulness (Kunstfertigkeit). At the end of the nine-
teenth century, this compound word geijiz (geijutsu) was coined as a
translation, or interpretation (Wiedergabe), of Western aesthetic
concept of art.The Japanese have adopted Western notions and trans-
lated them using words taken from their own tradition. Concerned
with the pre-modern form and the original experience of art, Heideg-
ger interrogates searchingly,
What preceded these adaptations? Was it a picture they saw in a
work of art? Which was their original experience of art before the
adoption of European concepts? This is the interesting point.57
Heidegger seems to be very earnest in finding out the primitive
word that is occluded from modern European influences. In response,
Hisamatsu cites an older word for art, geido¯ ( ) ( ). Liter-
ally, geido¯ means the way of gei; do¯ ( ) ( ) is equivalent to the
Chinese word dao. As Hisamatsu explains, do¯ has the connotation of
way, or method. It also refers to nature and life.
Heidegger’s phrase “our sense of the word [art]” has to be taken
with caution. It is well known that Heidegger opposes himself against
metaphysical conception of art that involves a subject–object relation,
and proposes a view of art as what shelters truth, as “the letting
happen of the advent of the truth of beings.”58 In order to overcome
metaphysical conception of art, he is motivated to know how art is
understood in the old Asian traditions, where, as he must have often
been informed by his numerous Japanese visitors, is absent dualistic
metaphysical framework of representation. In these traditions, he
may be able to find ideas about art that are distinct from metaphysical
conceptions, and at the same time suit well his innovative notion of
art, or lend an aid to his philosophizing. For example, as Heidegger
mentioned in the same colloquium, East Asian art sees representation
as a hindrance that will be removed once one has reached the source.
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Also, the picture is neither a symbol nor visual imagery; rather, in
painting or writing one sets in motion the movement toward the self.
In spite of all these considerations, it is Heidegger’s deep-seated
belief that, fundamentally speaking, overcoming metaphysics can only
be achieved from within Western philosophical tradition itself, and a
genuine questioning of a tradition can only come from within. There-
fore, any inquiry about non-Western sources has to start from the
European standpoint. To turn the inquiry the other way around, to
set as the aim an examination how East Asian people would think of
what is taken to be art in the West (as Gundert suggested), for
Heidegger, would lead to subjecting the whole of Western tradition to
external questioning, that is, from the standpoint of East Asia.
This is why Heidegger insisted that the participants keep to what he
calls the preliminaries by asking whether there is a word in Japanese
for what is called art in Europe. It could be said that Heidegger’s
philosophical enterprise remains to be immanent in that radical ques-
tioning is always to be evaded. He is not ready to subject existing key
notions and themes from Western tradition to external challenges.
This holds true even when Heidegger made two favorable remarks
about East Asian art in the same colloquium: One is, “what we have
been searching for so far, is already in place in Japan—the Japanese
actually have it.”59
This remark reminds one of a less-known record of Heidegger’s
encounter with the Chinese language. During a meeting with Chang
Chung-yuan on August 18, 1972, with reference to the idea of identity
of language with Being, Heidegger asked him whether this also occurs
in the ancient Chinese language. He also asks Chang how to say “this
is a tree” and “this is an old tree” in Chinese. Using expressions
steeped in Heidegger’s thought, Chang responded that the latter
expression showed that the being of the speaker and his utterance are
totally identified, or alternatively speaking, “belong together.”60
Heidegger seems to be wondering about whether ancient Chinese
language and Japanese art manifest certain features that he had been
trying to articulate. However, one must keep in mind his insistence on
pursuing any inquiry from the European standpoint. Another favor-
able remark is made in concluding the colloquium:
It has become clear that we, with our preconceived ideas, namely, the
conception of art as following a direct and steady path, cannot arrive
at the point the Japanese have already reached.61
This remark is consistent with Heidegger’s general attitude toward
Asian languages: Contemporary (European) thinking is not yet in a
position to confront what is present in Japanese thinking. A genuine
understanding of Asian traditions can only be possible after the West
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has renewed its tradition in the indeterminate future. Before that,
Asian language and thought is inaccessible because of an essential
linguistic barrier, or, alternatively speaking, because the Europeans
have not yet acquired the eye for pursuing these advanced, instead of
“preliminary” questions.
IV. Conclusion
How to render intelligible the seemingly irreconcilable suggestions
and implications of Heidegger’s comportment toward Asian lan-
guages? Why does he insist on highlighting the fact that he has no
access to these languages while sporadically engaging with these
alien languages, such as requesting information about the Japanese
word for art and about counterpart Sanskrit words for some of his
key philosophical terms? Notwithstanding the latter, Heidegger has
always held to his fundamental tenets and orientation of thinking, that
is, a reversal of the current situation, where Western dualistic meta-
physical thinking has become planetary and ancient Asian inheritance
remains inaccessible to both European and contemporary Asian
intellectuals. This reversal or the “other beginning” can only be
achieved from the very origin that gives rise to these “precarious”
circumstances. In other words, the most urgent task is for Western
philosophical tradition to transform itself from within, to reconfigure
what was said in the first beginning with Greek thinkers and their
language. Because of this historical necessity, the statement that any-
thing “authentically” Asiatic is inaccessible is not a factual observa-
tion, but of normative nature. The project of reversal has to proceed
without any genuine challenge from the Asiatic.
Heidegger may have assimilated a few specific words and verses
from Asian intellectual sources into some of his writings, and, insofar
as this aspect is concerned, he could be called a minimalist “intercul-
tural” thinker in a carefully qualified sense. On a positive note, it could
also be said that he initiates a style of reading Asian classics and of
interpreting Asian ideas analogous to his approach to Western clas-
sical thinkers. However, Heidegger’s interest in Asian words and
verses is limited to the practice of finding support for his own precon-
ceived ideas. Throughout all his inquiries about Asian words and
encounter with Asian sources, Heidegger has never thought of modi-
fying his central ideas in light of the insight from other traditions, for
example, the idea that language is central for the notions of clearing
and thinking, or the idea that the human being assumes an indispens-
able role as the guardian of Being. Because of the “preliminary”
character of his queries, because of his insistence that those queries be
334 lin ma
made from a European perspective, requesting certain items of infor-
mation about Asian languages neither conflict with nor detract from
the central thrust of his Denkweg.
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